S1 Model documentation
The documentation for the simulation model LimnoSES follows the Overview-Design-Details-and-Decision-making (ODD+D) protocol (1) .
LimnoSES is a coupled system dynamics, agent-based model to simulate socialecological feedbacks in lake use and management. The focus lies on shallow lakes where ecological regime shifts can occur between the turbid and the clear water state. We provide a regime shift evaluation tool which considers social responses and regulation mechanisms of nutrient inflow to the lake. In particular, the coordination among private house owners with insufficient sewage water systems and the regulating municipality play an important role since it causes time lags of social responses to changes in the lake state.
Overview I.i.a What is the purpose of the study? The main purpose of the model is to simulate social-ecological feedbacks in lake use and management where ecological regime shifts can occur between the turbid and the clear water state. We further extend traditional regime shift evaluations with an investigation of transient dynamics from social responses and regulations affecting the nutrient load to the lake. In particular, the issues of cooperation between different interest groups and time lags of social responses to changes of the lake state play an important role.
I.i.b For whom is the model designed?
For scientists of different disciplinary backgrounds who contribute to research on lake management and look for a deeper understanding of the interplay between social and ecological dynamics.
I.ii.a What kinds of entities are in the model?
The model consists of a social and an ecological submodel. The following descriptions describe both submodels separately.
Ecological entities: The ecological submodel represents the lake that includes the stocks for a predator and a prey fish species (pike -Esox Lucius and bream -Abramis brama respectively). The density of macrophytes is estimated as a function from bream. Social entities: One agent represents the municipality and its function to regulate sewage treatment and potentially enforce the upgrade of sewage treatment systems from private house owners. Hundred agents represent private house owners that release nutrients to the lake and decide on potential upgrade of their sewage treatment system.
(OSS) that can be upgraded. House owners are characterized by a willingness-to-upgrade that can be increased by information through neighbors who upgraded their sewage system ('social engagement') or through regular checks by the municipality ('central enforcement').
I.ii.c What are the exogenous factors/drivers of the model?
Ecological submodel: The food web in the lake is driven by the amount of nutrients which can be a time series for nutrient increase/decrease scenarios. In the coupled model, the amount of nutrients is subject to the number of households that release insufficiently treated sewage water into the lake.
Social submodel: The abundance of nutrients is monitored by the municipality to estimate the necessity to regulate private sewage treatment. Different nutrient levels are assumed in the scenarios to trigger regulation and inform the private house owners about the need to upgrade their sewage system.
I.ii.d If applicable, how is space included in the model?
Not included within functions. Lake and land area are visualized on the simulation platform to support model understanding.
I.ii.e What are the temporal and spatial resolutions and extents of the model?
The ecological submodel runs on daily time steps, the social submodel on annual time steps. Thus, the processes of monitoring/legislation and house owner decisions about upgrading the private sewage system are made once per year.
I.iii.a What entity does what, and in what order?
 Pollution: House owners release nutrients through their OSS and in case they were informed about the need to upgrade the OSS, they decide whether to do this investment (can be done only once). If house owners upgrade their OSS in the 'social pressure' scenario, they also inform their neighbours about the modernization which increases their neighbours' willingness to upgrade.  Ecosystem dynamics: Nutrients affect the system dynamics of lake: fish (bream and pike) and macrophytes.  Regulation: The Municipality evaluates monitoring results and starts the legislation for private sewage treatment when the triggering nutrient level is passed. As a consequence, house owners are informed about the new law and the need to modernize their OSS. For the 'central enforcement' scenario, municipal inspectors are sent out to check on the installed OSS and to motivate house owners which increases their willingness to upgrade.
Design Concepts
Theoretical and empirical background II.i.a Which general concepts, theories or hypotheses are underlying the model's design at the system level or at the level(s) of the submodel(s) (apart from the decision model)? What is the link to complexity and the purpose of the model?
The model addresses social-ecological interactions and therefore includes a social and an ecological submodel that describe the specific subsystem characteristics. The main interactions are monitoring of the lake's state and potential pollution of the lake by applying insufficient sewage treatment installations. Further interactions are foreseen for upcoming versions, as for example biomanipulation or the use of multiple ecosystem services.
The ecological submodel is a reimplementation of a minimum model that enables regime shifts between the clear and the turbid state of the lake (2) . The social submodel is based on assumptions on social norms that in some situations might overwrite the purely economic reasons for a certain behavior. The case is in general informed by current lake management practices in Sweden and regulation of on-site sewage (OSS) treatment systems (3).
II.i.b On what assumptions is/are the agents' decision model(s) based?
The municipalities decision on regulating private sewage treatment is based on nuntrient levels which are assumed to trigger regulation. Triggering nutrient levels can be classified as pro-active (with values below 2.1, which is the critical nutrient value or tipping point), intermediate (around 2.5) and late (3.0). House owner agents are assumed to take individual decisions when requested to upgrade their sewage system. They find themselves in a high-cost low-benefit situation (4) and tend to avoid timely upgrade of their OSS (expressed by the variable willingness-to-upgrade).
II.i.c Why is/are certain decision model(s) chosen?
Due to a lack of empirical evidence, only the simplest assumptions are used here: a probability called willingnessto-upgrade that determines when house owners upgrade their OSS. 
II.i.d

II.ii.b What is the basic rationality behind agent decision-making in the model? Do agents pursue an explicit objective or have other success criteria?
Not applicable.
II.ii.c How do agents make their decisions?
Decision making is triggered by the information about sewage regulations from the municipality. Then current value for the willingness-to-upgrade is the probability with which they decide about the OSS update.
II.ii.d Do the agents adapt their behavior to changing endogenous and exogenous state variables? And if yes, how?
The willingness-to-update can be changing through interventions, either through horizontal information from neighbours that recently updated their OSS or vertical through the municipality that sends out inspectors to check for the current state of the installed OSS. In both scenarios, the willingness-to-upgrade is increased by 50% but it cannot exceed 1.
II.ii.e Do social norms or cultural values play a role in the decision-making process?
In the 'central enforcement' scenario, inspectors are sent out by municipalities to check the current installation of private sewage systems. Based on empirical studies (15), we can assume that house owners want to follow the rules (represented by increase of their willingness-to-upgrade).
II.ii.f Do spatial aspects play a role in the decision process? No
II.ii.g Do temporal aspects play a role in the decision process?
Yes, the willingnessto-upgrade is increased either through stochastic interaction with neighbors or by central enforcement (inspector checks) from the municipality. So, with increasing values for the willingness-to-upgrade, the probability for upgrades increases over the course of one simulation.
II.ii.h To which extent and how is uncertainty included in the agents' decision rules?
Not applicable. 
Learning
II.iii.a Is individual learning included in the decision process? How do individuals
II.iv.d Are the mechanisms by which agents obtain information modelled explicitly, or are individuals simply assumed to know these variables?
The municipality receives annual updates on the current nutrient content in the lake, it does not read daily variations.
II.iv.e Are the costs for cognition and the costs for gathering information explicitly included in the model? No.
Individual prediction
II.v.a Which data do the agents use to predict future conditions? II.v.b What internal models are agents assumed to use to estimate future conditions or consequences of their decisions? II.v.c Might agents be erroneous in the prediction process, and how is it implemented?
Interaction
II.vi.a Are interactions among agents and entities assumed as direct or indirect?
In the scenario of 'social engagement', the horizontal information exchange about OSS update is considered to be direct.
II.vi.b On what do the interactions depend?
On the spatial distance, we assumed a neighborhood radius of three units (grid cells).  Ecological lag 1: Years between nutrient concentration transgressing the tipping point towards the turbid state (2.1) and pike levels dropping below 1.5 (below initial level).  Ecological lag 2: Years between nutrient concentration transgressing the tipping point towards the clear state (0.9) and pike levels returning to a level above 1.5. (= lake recovery)  Policy lag: Years between the ecological tipping point (2.1) transgressed and municipality initiating regulation. The nutrient levels at which the municipality takes action can be pro-active (at nutrient load 2.0), intermediate (2.5) or late (3.0), resulting in different policy lags.  Implementation lag: Years between the design of a policy by the municipality and 95% of house owners completing the OSS upgrade.  Social response lag: Policy lag + implementation lag.  Nutrient restoration time: Years between nutrient concentration transgressing the tipping point towards the turbid state (2.1) and turning back to clear state (0.9).  Ecological response lag: Years between house owners completing the upgrade until pike levels return to levels above 1.5.  Pike restoration time: Years between pike levels dropping below 1.5 (below initial level) and returning to levels above 1.5.  Lake restoration time: Years between nutrient concentration transgressing the ecological tipping point and pike levels returning to levels above 1.5.
II.vi.c
Details
III.i.a How has the model been implemented?
The ecological submodel was first implemented in Matlab Grind to identify suitable value ranges for the alternative stable states. The coupled model was then implemented in NetLogo 6.0.1 where the ecological submodel was reproduced within the system dynamics editor. The social submodel was implemented with the common NetLogo interface.
III.i.b Is the model accessible, and if so where?
LimnoSES is published through Comses.net For the ecological submodel test, we initialized the lake variables either for the turbid or the clear state: The values stem from two independent implementations, one in Matlab where we identified stable states numerically and one from a reimplementation NetLogo.
III.iii.a Does the model use input from external sources such as data files or other models to represent processes that change over time? No
III.iv.a What, in detail, are the submodels that represent the processes listed in 'Process overview and scheduling'?
House owners release nutrients
Assumptions: We have a total number of households (h) that may contribute to eutrophication of the lake through untreated sewage leaking into the catchment. This drives the ecological model by a linear increase in nutrient inflows reflecting an increase in number of summer houses that lead to the eutrophication problems.
-A minimum threshold of polluting households is tolerated (tl) that does not lead to increases in nutrients in the lake -The number of affectors above this threshold tl translates linearly into an amount of sewage-water with a maximum value 0.1 -If less than the threshold tl is polluting, the difference is contributing in the same way (linearly) to reduction of nutrients until the initial nutrient level is reached. This means that at a tl of 50% and 80% of households upgraded the OSS, 30% of the maximal change value of nutrients is applied to reduce the current nutrient level in the lake. Tolerance values lower than 50% would indicate that a slower maximum decrease in nutrients is possible than increases. b) 'social pressure': individual house owners perceive the state of the lake through swimming or fishing activities. Since they are educated, they also see the necessity to upgrade their sewage system but this 'mind shift' may happen at certain events and not for all house owner at once. But as soon as they see their neighbor doing it, the compliance rate is high. III.iv.c How were the submodels designed or chosen, and how were they parameterized and then tested?
III.iv.b What are the model parameters, their dimensions and reference values?
We used the following routine to examine the iteratively added submodels:
1. Test to find out whether submodels exhibit multiple stable states, determine initial conditions that lead to stable state. Compare Matlab Grind hysteresis curve evaluation of the original lake model with the ABMsystem dynamics implementation in NetLogo through equation-free analyses (5).
2. Check: How do parameter changes affect equilibrium? Which parameters allow for large or only small changes while keeping the characteristics of the system? 3. Evaluate: How do links/interrelations between different minimal models change the system stability?
4. Extend this test (2./3.) to include more social processes and variables.
S2 Model assumptions, integration and sensitivity analysis
Shallow lake restoration practice that inspired model development. Shallow lakes can abruptly shift from a clear water state to a turbid one and under some conditions also back from turbid to clear (2) . They serve as iconic example of an ecological regime shift and are targeted in many studies for management interventions (6) . Our model is based on a typical situation in Sweden where many lakes are in turbid states and local actors aim to restore water quality to meet local needs and the goals of the EU Water Framework Directive (7) . The main anthropogenic drivers linked to eutrophication are nutrient leakage from fertilizers in agriculture, insufficient municipal and private sewage treatment (8) . In Sweden, nutrient inputs from agriculture and municipal water treatment plants have been regulated since the early 1990's and decreased at many places nearly to levels that existed before lakes went turbid. A large part of today's remaining nutrient inputs, about 15% for phosphorous, result from untreated wastewater inflow from summer houses that lie at coasts and in watersheds of lakes (3). While a national regulation has been passed that makes private water sewage treatment mandatory, there is lack of enforcement and a high barrier for private investments in this technology, influencing the effectiveness of the measure (4). House owners find themselves in a high cost -low benefit situation since they are not necessarily connected to the clear lake's benefits. The reduction of nutrient loads from private sewage treatment is mostly regulated and controlled by local authorities (3) . In a comprehensive survey with house owners in Sweden, two mechanisms to overcome barriers to implementation were identified (3): 1) a top-down mechanism where government officials visit private homes, inspect the currently installed sewage system and convince house owners of the need to upgrade, and 2) a horizontal mechanism where people adopt the new technology because of social pressure from neighbors who have already adopted. We selected these two mechanisms to investigate their effect on the implementation lag and, subsequently, their impact on the total restoration time of the lake.
Model integration and sensitivity analysis. LimnoSES simulations run with annual time steps for the social system and daily steps for the ecological system. Each simulation starts with a clear lake and house owners with insufficient sewage treatment systems, low willingness-to-upgrade. The experiments were designed to disentangle the effects of the two social time lags on total restoration time while the lake is in transition between the clear and the turbid state.
Once a year, the nutrient and pike levels are checked by the municipality. If they transgress a previously chosen threshold (triggering nutrient level) that indicates a lake development towards the turbid state, the municipality creates a new policy for private sewage treatment. This involves an update of the sewage system by each house owner, who is performing the update dependent on the probability of 'willingness-to-upgrade', to reduce the nutrient flow from the catchment to the lake. Annually, the nutrient flow to the lake is updated dependent on the number of not-upgraded sewage systems. The change in nutrient concentration affects other processes in the lake in a non-linear way through several ecological feedbacks. Ecological dynamics, both the direction of the lake transition as well as its speed, are the result of the interplay of ecological processes that strengthen the turbid attractor with those that strengthen the clear one.
We run all simulations for 100 years and present averages of 20 repetitions, as more repetitions do not change outcomes. The experiments performed for the results in the main manuscript and in the SI Appendix are described in Table S2 and link from there to the individual figures. We first analyze the response of the lake to the timing of the policy and the enforcement scenarios separately (Fig. 2, 3) , then combine them to assess the sensitivity of lake restoration to social dynamics (Fig. 4) , and finally investigate the substitutability of the two social time lags (Fig. 5 ).
We analyzed the sensitivity of total lake restoration time to both social time lags (policy lag + implementation lag) under different scenarios of a) the policy lag, b) the implementation lag, and c) the initial willingness-to-upgrade (Table S2 ). For the policy lag experiment, we vary the value of the triggering nutrient concentration, to analyze the effect of different levels of awareness by decision makers or different durations of the political process of developing the policy on total lake restoration time. We have selected three triggering nutrient concentrations: a proactive strategy, where the policy is triggered shortly before nutrient concentrations enter the basin of attraction of the turbid state (nutrient concentration of 2.0), an intermediate strategy where the effects of increased nutrient concentration are already visible in terms of decreasing pike (2.5) and a late strategy where changes in the ecology of the lake are reinforcing a shift in the fish population (3.0). For the implementation lag experiment, we vary the type of social mechanism (no enforcement, central enforcement, social pressure) to assess the effect of the emerging implementation lag on total lake restoration time. Triggering nutrient level at which policy response is initiated [2, 2.5, 3] ; social mechanism is either no implementation lag (baseline), or implementation lag without enforcement. (Fig. 2 in manuscript) How fast do the two social mechanisms for promoting sewage system upgrades result in full adoption of the new technology?
Social mechanism [no enforcement, social pressure, central enforcement] with an intermediate willingness to upgrade ( Fig. 3 in manuscript) 
Identify opportunities for restoration
To which lag is the restoration time most sensitive to (policy lag, implementation lagmechanism, implementation lagwillingness to upgrade)? 
Investigate the degree to which time lags can be compensated
How can the policy time lag be compensated?
The triggering nutrient level is varied by +-20% [2, 2.5, 3] ; willingness to upgrade by +-50% [0.1, 0.2, 0.3]; social mechanism [no enforcement, social pressure, central enforcement] (Fig. 5 in manuscript, Fig. S4 , S5 in SI appendix) Table S3 . Parameters for social mechanisms to reinforce the upgrade of private water sewage treatment systems are tested in a sensitivity analysis (Fig. S1, S2 
Fig. S1.
Time series for upgraded households tested against parameter variations in the social mechanism implementation (see explanations for value variations in Tab S2). The greatest sensitivity is observed under low willingness to upgrade values (left column).
Fig. S2.
Lake restoration time evaluated over extreme parameter variations for the social mechanism. The quicker the response mechanism (from left to right), the lower the willingness to upgrade value at which the two mechanisms perform equally regarding lake restoration time. At the same time, the two mechanisms differentiate over the willingness to upgrade gradient showing that the social pressure mechanisms is more efficient with its parameter set for the fastest response.
Fig. S3.
Lake restoration time from the local sensitivity analysis against the triggering nutrient level (policy lag), willingness-to-upgrade (wtu, implementation lag). A-C show the sensitivity analysis for a wtu baseline value 0.2, +/-20% as discussed in the manuscript differentiated for Ano enforcement, Bsocial pressure, and Ccentral enforcement on the house owners wtu value.
Fig. S4.
Lake restoration time systematically evaluated over complementary parameter value combinations compared to Fig. 5 in the manuscript. Lake restoration time is greatest with low willingness-to-upgrade (wtu) values (A) and decreases with greater wtu (C). At the same time, the sensitivity towards the triggering nutrient level increases (steeper slop along x-axis). Low triggering nutrient levels (tnl), which equal to short policy lags, cause the restoration time to shorten (B), while it increases with greater tnl (D). Here, the sensitivity towards wtu decreases with longer policy lags.
Fig. S5.
Alternative representation of results from Figure 5 in the manuscript. A) Restoration time for different policy (triggering nutrient threshold) and implementation time lags with a willingness-to-upgrade of 0.2 (left) and the different willingness to upgrade values with a policy lag at a nutrient threshold of 2.5 (right). The total restoration time is divided into the time lag of social response to the turbid state (red) and the time lag of the lake response (blue). We compare the time lags for three scenarios, without and with two different types of social enforcement. B) shows the same data as relationship of social response lag to the ecological response lag to identify which feedbacks dominate at what time.
In the reference scenario with an intermediate willingness-to-upgrade (0.2) the social time lag is similar for both enforcement scenarios; however, the ecological time lags vary which is at the first sight surprising. Here, one can see the implications of the difference in temporal trajectories between the social pressure and central enforcement scenarios highlighted in Figure 3 . Although both reinforcement scenarios reach the 95% level of sewage system upgrades at the same time, the social pressure mechanism enabled a quicker adoption and hence nutrient reduction than the central enforcement scenario. In this case, enforcement through social pressure hence resulted in a faster recovery. Example for how to read Table S4 : We assume a baseline scenario towards which we compare the effects from changing the triggering nutrient value (policy lag), the willingness-to-upgrade, or the enforcement scenario (implementation lag). To compensate a 5-year delay in policy making (social response lag +26.4%) one would look for a scenario which results in a similarly sized relative change (for instance social pressure: -27.6%, or increase of wtu by 50%: -29.4%)
